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In The SUPREME COURT 
Of The STATE Of UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF DALLAS BED-
FORD LEWIS, ALSO KNOWN 
AS D. B. LEWIS, DECEASED. 
LUCILLE PARKER, J AC K 
HElDT and ROBERT GASTON 
Appellants. 
vs. 
ERNEST L. LEWIS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 
10719 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Rehearing of the above-entitled matter is prayed for 
by the Respondent, Ernest L. Lewis. 
BASIS FOR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Court should rehear this matter and reconsider 
ih; decision rendered August 11, 1967, reversing the judg-
ment d the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Mill-
ard County. It is respectfully submitted that said reversal 
is erroneous because the trial court was vested with dis-
cret,on as to whom it should appoint as the personal rep-
resentative of the estate and no showing was made that 
the trial court abused its discretion in granting letters of 
administration to the respondent. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS VESTED WITH 
DISCRETION IN THE APPOINTMENT OF A 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF TH~ ESTATE 
The law around which the contest in this case is cen-
tered is Section 75-3-4, U.C.A. 1953, which provides: 
If the person named in a will as executor for thirty 
days after he has knowledge of the death of the testator 
and that he is named as executor, fails to petition for 
the probate of the will and for letters testamentary, he 
may be held to have renounced his right to letters, and 
the court may appoint any other competent person 
administrator, unless good cause for the delay is shown. 
Though the main opinion of the Court does not explic-
itly so state, repondent infers that the Court concurs wt:i 
the respondent that the foregoing section applies equally 
in ancillary and domiciliary adm ·nistraticn proceedingil. 
The Court makes no contrary statement in its main opin-
i.on and the dissenting opinion ably expounds this point. 
It being thus assumed that the Court is well aware of, and 
apparently in accord with, respondent's position that the 
thirty day limitation in the code section quoted above is 
applicable in this case, the point will not be further be-
labored. 
In applying the foregoing code section to this case, 
the following facts are crucially pertinent: Decedent died 
on April 25, 1966. The appellants, who were named in 
decedent's last will and testament as trustees, were aJI 
informed of his death on April 26, 1966. The appellants 
each had a copy of decedent's will and were aware of the 
contents thereof on April 26, 1966. (Tr. 15, 69) By May 
3, 1966, all of the appellants hnd filed petitions for ap-
pointment as executors of the estate of the decedent in 
---
the State of California. All of the appellants thought 
they were intended to be named as executors in the said 
will. (Tr. 4, 71) They knew that no one was actively op-
posing their appointment as executors and that no ob-
.: :'L·tj 0:1s were on file with the California Court. (Tr 4) 
ln view of the foregoing facts, it is submitted that 
the appellants were virtually certain they were the execu-
tors of the decedent's will. T11ey therefore had the same 
rcsponsibilit.es as though the title "exe:::utors" had been 
ar:p i.ccl to them in the will. Any doubt that could have 
('cdsted in their minds as to the possibility of their being 
nppointed executors by the dom:iciliary court could have 
been little different than the doubt which would have ex-
isted in their minds had the will used the term "exe:utors." 
The facts show that the appellants had every reason to 
hc 1 eve and actually d:.J believe that the California court 
would recognize them as executors of the decedent's will. 
If a slight kernel of doubt existed in their minds, it could 
hardly b2 considered sufficient ground upon which a 
supreme court could base a reversal of a district court 
decision. Yet, this Court has done exactly that. That 
slight kernel of doubt is, in the main opinion of the Court. 
t'ie hair's breadth between the affirming and reversing of 
the district court deci.s:on. 
Jn considering whether or not the appellants showed 
good cause for their delay in petitioning for letters testa-
mrntary in Utah, numerous factors must be taken into 
account. The determination of whether good cause was 
shown ought not to hang on the sheer thread of a minute 
e1ement of doubt, but should be based upon the founda-
tion of the preponderance of evidence. 
It is submitted that several things can reasonably be 
expected of persons who are virtually certain to be ap-
pointed as executors of an estate. Where the estate con-
sisb; uf properties in several states, it is reasonable to ex-
pect the prospective executors to make inquiries about 
the properties in all states. It is logical to expect them to 
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request reports from the managers and custodians of the 
properties in the various states. The appellants failed to 
do this not only while their appointment was pending 
but even after they were appointed by the California 
court. The respondent was the manager of the property 
in Utah and was temporarily in California and while ther2 
made numerous efforts and requests to be allowed to fam-
iliarize the executors with the Utah property. The execu-
tors not only failed to take advantage of his knowledge, 
but avoided him. (Tr. 31, 37, 53, 54, 86) 
lt is to be expected that the executors, or prospe:-
tive executors, might Initiate inquiry about legal counsel 
in other states where estate property might be located. In 
this regard, they might be expected to inquire of the man-
agers of the properties as to what legal counsel the dece-
dent had used prior to his death, which counsel might be 
expected to have valuable familiarity with the properties. 
But the appellants init.ated no such inquiries. (Tr. 86) 
lt would appear proper to expect the prospective 
executors to inquire about the laws in the states where 
estate properties were located. In this case, one of the 
executors was a lawyer and the others were represented 
by numerous lawyers. But nevertheless, an important stat-
utory deadline in the State of Utah was allowed to sl"p by 
without the executors apparent1y being cognizant of it. 
Though the foregoing actions might reasonably have 
been expected of the prospective executors prior to their 
appointment and certainly should have been expected of 
them immediately after their appointment, they took no 
interest whatever in the properties in Utah and other 
states until after the respondent informed them that he 
was filing a petition for letters of administration in Utah. 
Actually, the respondent would undoubtedly have had a 
better case had he also been more dilatory, but he was 
concerned about the good of the estate. It seems eminently 
fair to infer that the appellants would have waited an 
additional thirty days before applying for letters testa-
---
5 
mcntary in Utah had the respondent not awakened them 
Ly taking action himself. This inference is made from the 
tad that on July 6, 1966 (not on June 29 as stated in the 
mam opinion of the Court) when hearing was held on the 
ptitions of the parties hereto in the District Court of 
Millard County, the filing of petitions for letters testa-
mentary in the States of Idaho and Oregon was still 
pending (Tr. 13) 
The District Court considered all of these matters 
and then found as follows: 
As indicated above, the "trustees" knew as to their 
being named in the Will and how they were named in 
the Will on April 26, 1966, the day after decedent died, 
if not in fact hefore. They did not petition this court 
until June 13, 1966 which is not within the thirty day 
period provided by Section 75-3-4, U.C.A. 1953. 
This court finds that they did not show good cause, 
or in fact any cause for such delay, other than that they 
didn't feel it was important as compared with other 
mqtters, and that they were not concerned until after 
they were informed of the J}etition by Ernest L. Lewis. 
There was no showing that they were in any way pre-
vented from petition ;ng this court, and in fact there 
w'.ls t 0 stimony that Mr. Ernest L. Lewis informed one 
or more of them of the urgency for action in Utah, and 
that they ignored such statements and appeared to 
avoid contact with Mr. Lewis. (R. 102) 
Lark of diligence and lack of interest in the Utah 
properties were the obvious reasons for appellants' delay 
in filing for letters testamentary in Utah. Lack of know-
lPc!ge as to their being named as executors had nothing to 
r~o with it--according to the finding of fact made by the 
trial court. And the trial court's finding rests firmly upon 
thP solid foundation of the preponderance of the evidence. 
On thE other hand, the Supreme Court's reversal of the 
distr ct court decision hangs by a flimsy thread of a min-
utP element of doubt. 
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Moreover, "good cause shown" has not been such a 
momentus factor in the prior decisions of this Court. In 
applying the section of the code around which this case 
revolves, this Court has stated in the case of In re Love's 
Estate, 75 Utah 342, 353; 285 Pac. 299: 
It may be conceded that, where the petition by the 
party named as executor is filed in time, the court has 
no discretion but to appoint the party named exe::utor 
unless he is disqualifi€d by statute, but this court has 
already committed itself to the doctrine that failure to 
make timely application for letters testamentary leaves 
it in the discretion of the court whether he appoint:; 
the person having preferential right or some other com-
petent person. (emphasis added) 
The same reasoning was followed in the case of In 1·e 
Slater's Estate, 55 Utah 252, 257; 184 Pac. 1017: 
In any view that can be taken, therefore, appellant 
had lost his preferential right to be appointed adminis-
trator, and even though he was still qualified to act, yet 
his right to do so was no greater than the right of an.v 
other competent person. The district court was thus 
vested ... with "considerable discretion in the appoint-
ment of an administrator." 
When the Supreme Court of this state has made the 
unequivocal statement that it has committed itself to a doc-
trine of law, a lower court can be expected to rely upon 
that commitment. In view of the prior holdings of the 
Supreme Court, the trial judge felt secure in his knowledge 
that appointment of a personal representative of the estate 
was a matter clearly within his discretion. But now, the 
Supreme Court has reversed itself without even giving 
passing notice to its prior -:ryptic pronouncements of 
legal doctrine to which it was "committed." 
---
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DECISION SHOULD NOT BE 
DISTURBED IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING OF 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Since the law clearly vested the lower court with dis-
cretion in this matter, its decision ought not to have been 
reversed even though a majority of the Supreme Court 
Justi.c:es, had they been in the pos:tion of the trial judge, 
might have reached a different de:ision than was reached 
by the trial court, unless it was clearly shown that the 
trial court abused its discretion. This principle is suppor-
ted by the great weight of legal authority. Respondent'~ 
rnum>el respectfully seeks the opportunity to give the 
Court the benefit of citation to some of that authority and, 
hopefully, more lucid argument on this point than he pre-
viously presented. 
Jn commenting about a statute similar to the Utah 
co"'e section about which t:iis case revolves, Bancroft, Pro-
lmte Practice, 2nd Ed., Sec. 239 (note in supplement) 
states as follows : 
Such a statute as that described in the text is not 
mandatory but discretionary and the action of the trial 
court will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing 
of an abuse of discret:on. 
This doctrine has been applied by a California court 
in the rnse of In re Deutsch's E.~tate, 156 Cal. App. 2d 57, 
:118 P. 2d 847: 
... (T) he provisions of Section 234 (similar to 75-3-4, 
U.C.A. 1953) are not mandatory but dis:'retionary, and 
the action of the trial court will not be disturbed in the 
absence of a showing of abu8e of discretion. 
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And the same doctrine was pronounced by this court 
in the case of In re Slator's Estate, supra: 
The district court having discretion in the matter, we 
cannot reverse its ruling, unless it is made to appear 
that it has abused that discretion to the prejudice of a 
substantial right of the appellant. 
No showing whatever was made that the district 
court abused its discretion in appointing the respondent 
as ancilliary administrator with w~ll annexed. On the con-
trary, it was shown that the respondent was the person 
most familiar with the properties of the estate in Utah, 
that he has been manager of :::aid properties for many 
yean, that the decendent entrusted him with great respon-
sibilities and that the district court was amply justified 
in concluding that Ernest L. Lewis "has the best qualifi-
cations to serve of any person." (R.99) 
The doctrine that a district court decision should not 
be lightly disturbed is espcially applicable where it in-
volves the appointment of a personal representative of an 
estate. This is so be~ause the appointment is merely the 
beginning of the matter, and not the end as is most usual 
when a court decision is rendered. Consequently, the per-
son appointed by the district court undertakes the perfor-
mance of duties and it is greatly detrimental to the estate 
for those duties to be passed over to other persons just 
short of their completion--especia1ly in a situation where 
those duties are extremely complex as they must neces-
sarily be when they involve a large mining property. 
The abandonment by the Court in this case of its 
prior sound doctrine that a lower court decision ought not 
to be reversed unless an abuse of discretion is shown de-
prives the law of reasonable security and advances the 
cause of legal chaos. 
---
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CONCLUSIONS 
The Supreme Court decision reversing the judgment 
of the District Court of Millard County absolves the appel-
lants from the duty of reasonable diligence because of a 
flim<;y excuse. The district court weighed all of the evi-
dence and based its decision on the preponderance. The 
district court exercised sound discretion in appointing 
_the respondent as the personal representative of the estate~ 
, -'J'Of abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court should rehear 
--- and should not be reversed in the absence of a showing 
amt rE.consider the matter and appropriately modify its 
decision to affirm the decision rendered by the District 
r,ourt of Millard County. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. LEE PETERSEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
